Preferencia de los bancos centrales por el largo plazo
Abstract
Central banks have sometimes turned their attention to long-term interest rates as a target or as a diagnosis of policy. This paper describes two historical episodes when this happened—the U.S. in 1942- 51 and the UK in the 1960s—and uses a model of inflation dynamics to evaluate monetary policies that rely on going long. It concludes that these policies for the most part fail to keep inflation under control. A complementary methodological contribution is to re-state the classic problem of monetary policy through interest-rate rules in a continuous-time setting where shocks follow diffusions in order to integrate the endogenous determination of inflation and the term structure of interest rates.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Copyright / Open Access Policy: This journal provides immediate free open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of ideas and is distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The copyright will be retained by the authors. Articles are free for personal use but are protected by copyright in the sense that they may not be used for purposes other than personal use without the permission of the author.